socialization comes from Ronald Inglehart, Since his original publication of the materialism and postmaterialism thesis (Inglehart, 1971) , Inglehart has published a stream of books (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1977 Inglehart, , 1990 detailing his conception of materialism, and providing evidence for what he sees as the economic causes underlying materialistic socialization. This research has been widely influential, so much so that a recent search of the Social Sciences Citation Index revealed over 2,200 academic citations of Inglehart's work.
This article discusses the differences between conceptualizations of materialism developed by Inglehart, Richins, and Belk. It then describes Inglehart's developmental theory of materialistic socialization and tests the hypothesis that this theory can help explain the origins of materialism as understood in consumer psychology. In so doing, this article clarifies some of the relations between the two leading consumer psychological definitions of materialism and looks in more detail at the relation between materialism and subjective well-being.
INGLEHART'S, RICHINS'S, AND BELK'S MATERIALISMS
Before describing Inglehart's theory of materialistic socialization, we need to understand how his definition of materialism differs from work done in consumer psychology by Belk and Richins. Belk originally viewed materialism as a collection of three personality traits: envy, nongenerosity, and possessiveness (Belk, 1985) . A fourth trait, preservation, was added in subsequent cross-cultural studies of the materialism scale (Ger& Belk, 1996) . Preservation is a tendency to make experiences tangible through souvenirs and photographs. Because of its focus on materialism as a system of personality traits, Belk's construct willbe referred to as personality mate-
rialism)
Richins sees materialism as a system of personal values (e.g., Fournier & Richins, 1991; Richins, I994a, I994b; Richins & Dawson, 1992) . Values are enduring beliefs about what is fundamentally important, and are frequently divided into two types: personal and social. Personal values describe what people want for themselves as individuals, whereas so-'Althoughit is difficultto distinguish personality traits froman individual's underlying valuesystem,it ispossibleto see thattraitssuchasenvyand nongenerosity have an affectivecomponent that is lackingin the personal valuesconceptualization. whichoperationalizes materialistic valuesas a set of beliefs as opposed to feelings. For example, an item from Richins and Dawson's (1992) happiness subscale reads as follows: "My life would be better if I owned certain things that I don't have," whereas an item from Belk's (1985) envysubscalereadsas follows: "When friends have thingsI cannot afford it bothers me." This is also consistent with the operationalization of personality traits in the social psychology literature (e.g. •Larsen& Diener, 1987) . cial values describe how people think society as a whole should look (Mueller & Worn hoff, 1990 ). Richins defines materialism as a personal value stressing the importance of owning material possessions. Richins divides materialism into three parts: centrality, happiness, and success. Centrality is the general importance materialists attach 10 possessions and the idea that possessions playa central role in their lives. Happiness is the belief that owning the right possessions leads to well-being, and that one would be happier if one had more or better things. Finally, Richins defines materialists as people who believe success can be judged by the things people own. In this article, the authors refer to Richins's construct as personal values materialism.
Inglehart is a political sociologist, and as such, he defines materialism more broadly than is customary in consumer psychology (Hellevik, 1993, p. 223 ). Inglehart sees materialism as a chronic focus on lower order needs for material comfort and physical safety over higher order needs such as self-expression, belonging, aesthetic satisfaction, and quality of life (Inglehart, 1990, pp. 66-68) . This definition is consistent with the traditional notion that materialists emphasize worldly ambitions over spiritual matters (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, Vol. 9, p.466 , as cited in Richins & Rudmin, 1994) , but secularizes this definition by substituting self-actualization for spirituality. In Inglehart's terminology, the opposite of a materialist is a postmaterialist, someone who places great emphasis on satisfying higher order needs, even at the expense of financial rewards. A prototypical postmaterialist would be the artist who forgoes financial rewards in pursuit of his or her higher order needs for personal freedom, aesthetic expression, and self-actualization. Postmaterialism is not asceticism: postmaterialists do not reject wealth, but they give it a lower priority than nonmaterial satisfactions.
In developing his measure of materialism and postmaterialism, Inglehart began with Maslow's hierarchy (Maslow, 1970) , and then developed items to measure social values that reflect Maslow's needs. For instance, because materialists give priority to the lower order needs of sustenance and safety, they should see economic growth.low crime rates, and a strong national defense as important social values. Similarly, because postmaterialists give priority to higher order aesthetic, intellectual, belonging, and esteem needs, they place a high importance on social values such as protecting freedom of speech; giving people more say in community, workplace, and government decisions; and of having a less impersonal society where ideas matter more than money. From these examples we can see that Inglehart's definition of materialism refers to a broad-based sociopolitical orientation, rather than being narrowly focused on consumption. Therefore, Inglehart's materialism will be referred to as sociopolitical materialism and postmaterialism. Because Inglehart's definition of materialism extends beyond the boundaries ofconsumer psychology, we introduce his developmental theory-based model to guide understanding of the origins of materialism as defined by Richins and Belk. Inglehart provides a compelling, although admittedly partial, explanation of why some individuals and societies are more materialistic than others. Inglehart sees sociopolitical materialism and postmaterialism as the outcome of formative experiences of deprivation or affluence. Put simply, when people grow up in economically deprived environments they internalize a subjective sense of economic insecurity. When they become adults, this sense of economic insecurity stays with them and leads them to place a high value on material success (i.e., become materialists). Conversely, people who grow up with a subjective sense of economic security develop the lasting assumption that money is not something one needs to worry much about. As adults this translates into a "postrnaterialistic" orientation in which they feel free to pursue self-actualization even at the expense of material achievernent.s Adult materialism is linked to formative feelings of economicinsecurity, but "there is no one-to-one relation between economic level and the prevalence of materialist values.jor these values reflect one's subjective sense ofsecurity, not one's economic level per se" (lnglehart, 1990,p. 68 , italics added; see also Inglehart, 1977, p. 137) . Inglehart refers to one's subjective sense of economic well-beingas "formative affluence," or as "formative security" (Inglehart, 1990,pp. 121-124) , but we will refer to it asfeltformative affluence or felt formative deprivation to emphasize that it is a psychological experience rather than an economic fact. This is important because it suggests the need to measurepeople's subjective feelings of affluence, rather than simply measuring their objective economic circumstances. To date, however, all empirical work on Inglehart's theory has used economic data to infer felt formative affluence and deprivation, rather than looking at self-reported subjective experience. Inglehart's early work used generational differences (e.g., children of the great depression vs. baby boomers) as a proxy for felt formative affluence and deprivation (lnglehart, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1990) . Later, Inglehart (1979) looked at differences in social class within a single generation (Abramson & Inglehart, 1996) . Most recently, Inglehart has compared the populations of rich versus poor countries to argue that differences in felt formative deprivation between countries explain cultural differences (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995) . One contribution of this article is to introduce a measure of formative felt affluence and deprivation that can be used to more directly measure the influence of this construct on materialism. ' Inglehart's theoryis not uniquein takingthis approach. Whenappliedto class differences. lnglehart's theory is similar to work by Bourdieu (1984) and Holt (1998) . Data linking respondents' socialclass to their material social valuesconfirm this connection (Abramson & Inglehan, 1996 (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986) .On the contrary, "through a continuous interaction with the environment in its physical, cultural, and social manifestations, individuals develop a total integrated system of mental structures and contents that shape and constrain their modes of functioning" (Magnusson, 1990, p. 199) .However, this integrated system is composed of various parts, and it is reasonable to hypothesize that needsatisfaction has a greater impact on personality than it does on more cog-nitive constructs like social values. So, although H I states that felt formative deprivation should influence both forms of materialism, H2 addresses the relative strength of its influence on each form. H2: The influence offelt formative deprivation on materialism should be stronger for personality materialism than for personal values materialism.
The Social Milieu and the Origins of Materialism
Despite lnglehart's primary emphasis on formative felt affluence, he also allows for the possibility that materialism may be shaped by the social milieu that prevailed during one's formative years (Inglehart, 1977) . By "social milieu" we mean the values internalized through interactions with peer groups, role models, and the media (Moschis, 1987) . Whereas formative felt affluence focuses on whether individuals feel that their needs are being met, the formative social milieu refers to the lessons an individual learns from the community. In most cases, felt formative experiences and the formative social milieu are complementary forces on a person's development. However, when an individual's economic circumstances differ from the prevailing economic circumstances, need satisfaction and the formative social milieu predict different results. Imagine a girl growing up in a middle-class community during a period of general prosperity, but whose parents' business was in dire straits. Although she might often feel that her needs were going unmet, at school and in the media she would hear messages reflecting postmaterialist values. Need theory would predict that she would tend toward materialism, whereas social influence would predict the opposite. Therefore, it is desirable to separately measure felt formative affluence and respondents' perceptions ofthe formative social milieu in which they grew up, so that the impact of each can beassessed. Hypotheses relating felt formative deprivation to materialism have been stated earlier. Hypothesis 3 relates the social milieu to materialism.
H3: The formative social milieu, as reflected in the perceived materialism ofsocialization agents with whom respondents identified, should bepositively related to respondents' own levels of materialism. This should be true for (H3a) personal values materialism and (H3b) personality materialism.
Formative Felt Deprivation and Current Life Satisfaction
The relation between materialism and lower levels of life satisfaction is one of the most interesting and least understood findings from this literature (Belk, 1985; Kasser, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Richins & Dawson, 1992) . If
Inglehart's theory that materialism arises from formative experiences of felt deprivation is correct, then this theory can help explain why materialists suffer lower levels of subjective well-being in three related ways. First, materialists' lower levels of life satisfaction may be due, at least in part, to a lingering sense of dissatisfaction with their ability to meet their lower order needs left over from these earlier formative experiences (Marsh, 1975) . This suggests H4.
H4: People who score high on materialism should tend to be dissatisfied with their lower order needs. This should be true for (H4a) personal values materialism and (H4b) personality materialism.
Second, materialists' chronic sense of dissatisfaction with their lower needs may beaggravated by a tendency to place a high priority on these needs when assessing the overall success of their lives (Inglehart, 1977, pp. 116-147; La Barbera & Gurhan, 1997) . In this way, materialists are doubly vexed by intransigent feelings of material deprivation aggravated by a tendency to place issues of material success at the center of their identity. This suggests H5.
H5: The more materialistic one is, the more one's overall life satisfaction should be dependent on satisfying one's lower order needs. This should be true for (H5a) personal values materialism and (H5b) personality materialism.
Third, Inglehart's developmental theory also has implications for the ability of materialists to meet their higher order needs. Much of the literature sees materialists as people who attach greater importance to possessions than to people, leading to unsatisfying interpersonal relationships (Fournier & Richins, 1991; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Richins & Dawson, 1992) . This implies that materialism results not only in dissatisfaction with one's lower order needs, but in an inability to meet one's higher order needs, particularly the need for love and significant personal relationships. This does not necessarily contradict H4 and H5: it is quite possible for materialists to be less satisfied with both their lower order needs and their higher order needs. However, it does raise the issue of the relation between materialism and higher order need satisfaction, suggesting H6.
H6: People who score high on materialism should tend to be dissatisfied with their higher order needs. This should be true for (H6a) personal values materialism and (H6b) personality materialism.
Taken together, Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 paint a picture of materialists that is consistent with Inglehart's developmental theory. Early experiences of felt formative deprivation leave materialists with a lingering sense of material dissatisfaction (H4) and an increased priority on attaining material rewards (H5). This, in turn, leads to a neglect ofinterpersonal relationships and other mechanisms for meeting their higher order needs, yielding dissatisfaction in these areas as well (H6).
METHODOLOGY

Respondents
Data were collected in two waves at two Midwestern universities. Completed questionnaires were collected from a total of 287 students (133 women). At the first university, respondents were juniors and seniors enrolled in undergraduate marketing courses (139 students, including 58 women). At the second university, respondents were from all undergraduate levels (148 students, including 75 women).
Measures
Personal values materialism. Personal values materialism was measured using the materialism scale of Richins and Dawson (1992) . This measure consists ofthree subscales: (a) acquisition centrality, (b) happiness, and (c) success. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine the reliabilities, convergent validity, and uniqueness of the subscales. The coefficient as were .73, .74, and .76 for success, centrality, and happiness dimensions, respectively. Overall coefficient ex was .82, indicating satisfactory reliability. A partial aggregation approach was used whereby individual items are combined to form two indicators ofeach factor. This approach is preferred in the case of a multidimensional construct such as materialism or self-efficacy while maintaining consistency in the level ofabstraction across all dimensions (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994) . The resulting Comparative Fit Index (CFI) was .99 and Non-normal Fit Index (NNFI) was .98 with significant factor loadings and there was little variance to be explained (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; RMSEA =.048). Values of .90 or greater for the CFI and NNFI are generally considered satisfactory and both measures are not sensitive to sample size (Marsh, Balla, & Hau, 1996) . Factorcorrelations and factor loadings of this analysis are listed in Figure l. Personality materialism. Personality materialism was measured using Ger and Belk's (1996) revised materialism scale. Their cross-cultural study on materialism modified and expanded some scale items from Belk's (1985) original materialism .scale. The modified personality materialism scale includes four subscales: (a) possessiveness, (b) nongenerosity, (c) envy, and (d) preservation. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine the reliabilities, convergent validity, and uniqueness of the subscales. The preservation subscale, which yielded a negative factor loading (-.28) on Belk's materialism scale, was excluded from future analyses, because it did not fit the original conceptualization of Belk's materialism scale. Coefficient a for nongenerosity, envy, and possessiveness dimensions were .71, .57, and .44, respectively. The overall coefficient a was .71. Because the reliabilities of the subscales were not satisfactory, the overall scale was used and the items were therefore combined to form a single indicator for the construct. a total aggregation approach.
Felt formative deprivation.
Because established scales to measure subjective deprivation during childhood and adolescence were not available, measures were created for this study. Four items were generated to measure felt economic well-being. Respondents completed these items twice, once foragesOto 12and once forages 13 to 18 (see Figure 2 ).
Items were marked on a 5-point scale. ranging from strong disagreement to strong agreement. High scores on this scale indicated high levels of felt economic deprivation. The test-retest reliability was assessed in a pretest with 50 participants over a 6-week period. Test-retest reliability was quite satisfactory at r= .65 for childhood felt formative deprivation items, and r =.54 for teenage felt formative deprivation items .
Exploratory factor analysis yielded two factors for the two age periods that accounted for 60% of the variance. Coefficienta for the four items in age Oto 12 and age 13 to 18 were .73 and .71, respectively. Although a combined measure of felt formative deprivation could beused. a partial aggregation measurement model with two factors (each represented by summing the four items in each age period, 0-12 and 13-18) was tested to maintain consistency in the level of abstraction across all constructs (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994) . Because similarly worded items were likely to be correlated, the measurement model also included correlational paths between the two similarly worded items in both age periods. Finally, reo suits ofconfirmatory factor analysis showed this model to be acceptable, according to the criteria outlined earlier, X 2 (15) = 44.86, P = .00, CFI = .96, NNFI = .92. See Figure 2 for the two-factor measurement model.
The formative social milieu. To understand the impact of the formative social milieu in value acquisition, the messages respondents received from socialization agents (importantothers around the respondents)must be examined. The messages respondents received while growing up can then be compared to respondents' current levels of personal values materialism and personality materialism. This approach is consistent with existing studies of socialization, which typically compare the relations between the values held by respondents and their socializing agents (Bengston, 1975) . Ideally, this would be done through a longitudinal study, but recall-baseddata is acceptable in the initial phases of theory development. Three aspects of this study mitigate some common problems with recalled data. First, the measures used inthis researchasked respondentsto ratetheextent to which various socialization agents resembled widely held prototypeswithin our society (see Figure 3 for the item referring to the respondentsfather). Because it is a fairly common practice in our culture to categorize people in this way, it is likely that respondents could complete this task with a reasonabledegree of accuracy.Second, there is no obviousor direct relation between measures depicted in Figure 3 and the measuresfor personalityor personal valuesmaterialism,thus reducingthe likelihoodof spuriouscorrelations.Third,just as we are concerned with felt formative affluence rather than a person's objective economic circumstances, we are concerned with the way the respondents perceivedthe socializationagents around them(the subjectivenorm),ratherthan the actual attitudes of these persons.
The key socializing agents are family, school, peer group, and the mass media (Bengston, 1975; Corsaro & Elder, 1990; Elkin&Handel,1988; Moschis,1987,pp.72-176) .Figure3de-pictsthe itemmeasuring the perceived value priorities of the respondent's father. Similar items measured the perceived material values of the respondent's mother, parents' friends, teachers, religious leaders, local adult community as a whole, heroes or adults admired, samesex friends, opposite sex friends. and friends in general. Exploratory factor analysis yielded three factors accounting for56% of the variance. The first factor that emerged consisted of items measuring the perceived material values of the respondent's father, mother, parents' friends, and the local adultcommunity; the secondfactor contained perceptionsabouttherespondent's Same sexfriends, friends ingeneral, and heroes and people that one admires; and the lastfactor consistedof perceptions aboutreligious leaders, teachers, andopposite sex friends. Coefficient a for the three factors were .70,.69, and .39, respectively. Due to the low reliability, the last factor was not included in the analysis.' The remaining two factors were labeled family group and social group. This two-factor model was also tested using confirmatory factor analysis, and wasfound to beacceptable, X 2 (13)= 33.3I,p= .001;CFI= .95; NNFI= .91. Massmediainfluences do not playa majorrole in Inglehart's theory, and are therefore beyond the scope of this study. Figure4 showsthe measurement model on formative socialmilieu measures as well asthefactor loadings and factor correlation of these indicators.
Andrews and Withey LifeSatisfaction
Measure. AndrewsandWithey's(1976) 6-item measure ofsubjective well-being was usedin the study. This instrument has been used in past studies (Inglehart, 1977; Richins, 1987; Richins & Dawson, 1992) . Thesixitems measure feelings ofwell-being about thefollowing: (a) lifeas a whole; (b) amount of fun andenjoyment; (c) family, friends, and work[work waschanged to studies forthese student samples]; (d) income level; (e)standard of living; and(I) relationships with friends. Respondents were asked to rateon a 7-point scale (ranging from terrible to delighted) how they felt about life as a whole, how much fun and enjoyment they were having, and so forth. Exploratory factor analysis was conductedand two factorsemerged thataccounted for70% of the variance. The first factor consisted of items (I), (2), (3), and (6). Items (2), (3), and (6) were combined to form HNEEDS(satisfactionwith higher order needs; alpha = .74), whereas item (I) is used as a summary measure of life satisPast research has shown Ihat the extent of identification is closely related to the degree of social influence that a socialization agent can exert (Becherer & Morgan, 1982; Moschis, 1976) . For these three groups of socialization agents (teachers, religious leaders, and opposite sex friends), it appears that lhe degree of identification was generally so low that these measures were negatively correlated with other items. As to the influence of religious leaders, some respondents wrote margin notes indicating their lack of religious affiliation; often, the item was lefl blank. Regarding influence by opposite sex friends, it appears that, although many of Ihe respondents feel that they want to be auractiveto their opposite sex friends.they don' t necessariIywant to be like them. Finally, teachers may be perceived as authoritative figures to be rebelled against, or at least very distant socially, and not someone with whom the respondents would wantto be identified. Because these three items apparently represented categories of people with whom many of the respondents did notidentify. they weredropped from the social influence measures. faction. Items (4) and (5) emerged as a second factor and were combined to form LNEEDS (satisfaction with lowerorder needs; correlation =.54). Confirmatory factor analysisof the two-factormodel yielded a satisfactorymodel with"i (4)= 11.68, p= .02,CFI =.97, and NNFI =.93, indicatingan acceptable fit. Figure 5 shows the measurementmodel for higher order and lower order needs measuresas well as the factor loadings and factor correlation of these indicators.
Socioeconomic status measure.
Respondents' socioeconomic status (SES) is based on a combination of three dimensions: (a) reported family annual income level, (b) father's education, and (c) mother's education. Following established practice, these variables are combined into an overall measure of SES by averaging subjects' summed standardized scores for these measures (Rindfleisch et al., 1997) . Coefficient alpha for the combined measure was .60, acceptable for this type of exploratory study (Nunnally, 1978) , especially when one considers that these are correlations between demographic variables rather than psychometric items.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Felt Formative Deprivation andthe Origins of Materialism
A simultaneous test of several hypotheses was conducted using a structural equations model (see Figure 6 ), which uses felt formative deprivation and formative social milieu measures as antecedents to the materialism measures. Figure 6 shows that the causal pathfrom felt formative deprivation to personal values materialism is positive(y = .09, s.e. = .ern, but not significant, disconftrrning Hla.' However, the causal path from feltfonnativedeprivation to personality materialism is bothpositive and significant (y =.15, s.e. =,(17).
Although the failure of formative felt deprivation to significantly influence personal values materialism was unexpected, it is nonetheless generally consistent with H2 which proposes that felt formative deprivation should exert a greater influence on personality materialism than on personal values materialism. Figure 6 shows that the magnitude of the causal paths between felt formative deprivation (FFD) decreases as one moves from personality materialism (y =. IS, SE =.07) to personal values materialism, (y = .09, SE = .07). The fact that Yformalive felt deprivalion-personalily materialism was significant whereas Yformalive felt deprivalion·personal value. materialism was not, certainly suggests that H2 is on track. However the difference between these two gammas, whereas in the predicted direction, was not large enough to reach statistical significance.f 
SocialInfluence and the Origins Of Materialism
H3 hypothesizes that materialism is learned through the standard socialization process in which the child takes on the values and attitudes of the socialization agents with which he or she identifies. The causal path from social milieu to personal values materialism is positive and statistically significant ['(social milieu -personal values materialism =. 38, (SE = .10)), as is the causal path from social milieu to personality materialism [y . I . Figure 6 shows that the more affective-and personality-based aspects of materialism (Belk's measure, 1985) stem both from early experiences of felt deprivation and the role modeling of socialization agents, whereas the more cognitively based personal values materialism (Richins & Dawson's measure, 1992 ) is related primarily to the socialization process involving role models.
Materialism and the Satisfaction of Lower Versus HigherOrder Needs
Both H4 and H5 examine the relation between materia], ism and the satisfaction of lower order needs. H4 hypothesizes that high materialists are likely to be less satisfied with their lower order needs (income and possessions) than are low materialists. These findings are consistent with the idea that individuals who subjectively experience insecurity and deprivation in their formative years develop a lasting sense of dissatisfaction with their material condition that manifests itself as adult materialism. However, these findings could also be explained by the respondent's current economic situation, that is, people who are currently experiencing a low standard of living might be dissatisfied with their money and possessions and 6
• Contrary to past research. respondents who scored high on personal values materialism were not less satisfied with their lives as a whole (5.35 vs, 5.31. p = .78). However. replicating past findings. respondents who scored high on personality materialism were less satisfied with their lives as a whole (5.02 vs, 4.53. p = .0005). therefore score high on materialism. To role out this rival explanation, multiple regression analysis was conducted using satisfaction with lower order needs as the dependent variable and personal values materialism, personality materialism, and social class as predictors. For student respondents, personal income data is difficult to interpret, so their families' social class was seen as the best indicator oftheir current standard of living. Table 2 shows that for personal values materialism (H4a), high materialists tend to be less satisfied with their lower order needs, but the statistical significance of the relation is borderline <p=-.24,P=.06). For personality materialism, the relation was also in the predicted direction and reached statistical significance <p=-.64,p =.00(3), thus H4b is supported. Finally, as expected, one's SES also has a positive and significant influence <p =.33, p =.0006) on satisfaction with lower order needs, supporting the relevance of this measure. Thus, materialism has a negative impact on satisfac- Note. Standarddeviationsare listed in parentheses. .06
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tion with lower order needs, even after controlling for one's current standard of living. Personal values materialism has three subscales: success, centrality, and happiness. An examination of these subscales shows that the negative relation between personal values materialism and satisfaction with lower order needs was driven exclusively by the happiness dimension (see Table 3 ). Most of the items that measure happiness read "I would be happier if! could afford to buy more things," and so forth. In fact, all five items discuss the relations between happiness and having more things to enjoy life. Therefore, it is plausible that the negative relation was mostly driven by this connection between happiness and possessions, a lower order need. This finding is consistent with past work, which has found the happiness subscale to be the primary driver of the relation between personal values materialism and lower levels of subjective well-being (Ahuvia & Wong, 1995) .
Personality materialism also has three subscales: envy, nongenerosity, and possessiveness. The negative relation between personality materialism and satisfaction with lower order needs was driven by envy and nongenerosity. This makes sense; people who feel dissatisfied with their material situation are likely to feel envious of others and be disinclined to share what they have. It also stands to reason that people who feel dissatisfied with their material situation should be highly protective of what they have (possessive). However. although the relation between dissatisfaction with one's lower order needs and possessiveness was in the predicted direction, it failed to reach significance (see Table 3 ).
H5 hypothesizes that the more materialistic one is, the greater role satisfaction of lower order needs will play in one's overall life satisfaction. A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to test the moderating effect of materialism on satisfaction with lower order needs and satisfaction with one's life as a whole. A test of moderation is performed by entering each predictor variable and followed by the product term for their interaction. Presence of moderation is indicated by a significant 2-way interaction. Table 4 shows a nonsignificant interaction term for personal values materialism and satisfaction with lower order needs on overall life satisfaction (p = -.07, p = .38). H5a is therefore not supported.
However, a marginally significant interaction was found for personality materialism and satisfaction with lower order needs on overall life satisfaction (P = .20, P = .067). Thus, H5b is partially supported.
H6 hypothesizes that because materialists are fixated with meeting their lower order needs, they may neglect other areas of their lives and therefore be dissatisfied with their higher order needs as well. For personal values materialism, Table I shows no difference in the level of satisfaction with higher order needs for low versus high materialists (5.22 vs. 5.31, P= .46), disconfirming H6a. However, for personality materialism, the relation is in the predicted direction and statistically significant (5.50 vs. 5.05, p = .000), supporting H6b.
CONCLUSION
Inglehart proposed a model of materialistic socialization in which formative subjective experiences of economic deprivation and insecurity lead to a lifelong fixation with material needs at the expense of one's higher order needs. This prioritization of lower order needs over higher order needs manifests itself as materialism. This theory was tested by developing a measure of felt formative affluence and deprivation and relating it to Richins and Dawson's measure of personal values materialism and Belk's measure of personality materialism. This test supported the connection between felt formative deprivation and personality materialism, but did not support this connection for personal values materialism (see Table5) .
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The idea that adult materialism is linked to formative experiences of felt deprivation also leads to predictions about materialism and satisfaction of lower order versus higher order needs. Specifically, these formative experiences of felt deprivation may lead to a chronic dissatisfaction with one's material situation (H4), a tendency to prioritize lower order needs over higher order needs when assessing one's overall well-being (H5), and a consequent neglect ofone's higher order needs, leaving them unsatisfied as well (H6). Table 5 summarizes the findings from this article. It shows a consistent pattern of support for the connection between needs satisfaction and personality materialism, but it generally does not support the connection between needs satisfaction and personal values materialism.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the influence of felt formative deprivation on materialism should be stronger for personality materialism than for personal values materialism. The evidence for H2 was mixed. A comparison of the magnitude of the causal paths between felt formative deprivation and personality materialism (1 =.15) versus felt formative deprivation and personal values materialism (y =.09) was in the predicted direction, but not statistically significant. However, consistent with H2, the causal path between felt formative de- This article reveals how differences in the affective and cognitivecontentof thesetwo typesof materialism relatesystematically to differences in the types of developmental events that are associated with them. The contrast between personal values materialism, where felt formative deprivation may be irrelevant, and personality materialism, where felt formativedeprivationseems critical, suggestsa symmetry betweenwhat goes into an individual in the formof experiences, and what comes out in the form of espoused beliefs and emotional reactions. When emotions go in, emotions come out: that is, early emotionalexperiencesmay influence emotional reactionslater in life. Feeling materially deprived as one grows up is a very emotion-laden situation.Emotions experienced in one's youth may pattern one's emotional responses into adulthood. Because personalitymaterialism has many items that pick up on emotional responsesand tendencies, it reflects the emotion-laden outcomesof felt formative deprivation. Because Richins' measure of personal values materialism taps less affective content, it is only weakly related to felt formative deprivation.
In contrast to feltformative deprivation, thesocial milieu dependsheavily (although notentirely) onsocialization agents imparting cognitive information to theindividual. Whencognitive information goesinin theform of social influence, cognitive information comesoutintheform of values. Thisexposure tocognitive influence affects personal values, because theyhavesuch astrong cognitive component. Although Belk's personality materialism ispredominantly affective, italsohac; a significant cognitive component, which helpsexplain why ittooissignificantly correlated with the formative social milieu.
The social influence measures here are specifically tied to whether socialization agents communicated materialist and postrnaterialist values to the respondents. This indicates that the sociopolitical materialism and postmaterialism respondents wereexposed to growingup predicts the extent of their currentmaterialism, even whenmaterialism is conceptualized quite differently. The connections between these constructs may run fairly deep, and future investigation is warranted. Also, the predictive powerof social influence in general may be increased withthe development of new measures of social influence thatfocus on forms of socialinfluence leading to personality materialism or personal valuesmaterialism.
Futureresearchcould also helpcorrect some of the limitations of this study. Specifically, before the connection between felt formative deprivation and personal values materialism can be ruled out, studies are needed in populations which show greater variance in felt formative deprivation. Although steps were taken to insure variance on this measure,significantly greater variancecould be achieved by comparingFirst Worldand Third World populationsor other groups with large income disparities. However, this sample is relevant for understanding the causes of individual differences in materialism within the broad American middleclass. Future work may also avoid the reliance on recall measures used in this study. Finally, replication is needed to clarify findings that were borderline in their statistical significance.
One of the most important findings with regardto materialism is the consistentrelation betweenhighlevelsof materialism and low levels of life satisfaction (Ahuvia & Wong, 1995; Wright & Larsen, 1993) . This study points researchers interestedin thisissue in severaldirections. First,personality materialism showed a generally more robust connection to life satisfaction than did personal values materialism. Unfortunately, despite attempts to improve this scale (Ger & Belk, 1996) , it's measurement properties are still less than ideal. Future researchers may wish to scrutinize the connection between this constructand life satisfaction withthe aim of developing a new measure. Past researchers have generally treated personal values materialism as a single construct. However, researchers interested in the psychology of subjectivewell-being may wish to rethinkthis practice. Table 3 confirmspast research (Ahuvia & Wong, 1995) in showing that the relation between personal valuesmaterialism and life satisfaction is almostentirely driven by the Happiness subscale. Future researchers may wish to breakout thissubscaleand treatit as a uniqueconstruct, because its relation to dependent variables of interest differs so strongly from the other subscales in this measure.
In a more speculative vein, thisworksuggests a possible linkbetween research on materialism andonattachment theory (Bowlby, 1973) . In attachment theory, formative childhood relationships form themodels foradult social relationships, so "insecure attachments" inchildhood lead to problematic relationships inadulthood (Hazan & Shaver 1987; Shaver& Hazan, 1988) . Similarly, early developmental feelings of economic security or insecurity may form the basis for lifelong mental models of person-object relations. Intheparticular instance examined here, felt formative insecurity becomes the blueprint for adult personality materialism. However, future research may wish to explore how moresecure formative economic environments alsoserveas blueprints foradult person-object relations.
Finding the causes of materialism is a pressing concern, as is further exploration of the precise nature of the relation between materialism and negative outcomes for materialists. This article has made some headway in these issues by linking the origins of materialism to formative experiences. In so doing, it has provided a new theoretical model of materialism and laid the groundwork for further research.
